Corporate Social Responsibility in a Comparative Perspective

Comparative studies of corporate social responsibility (CSR) are relatively rare, certainly as contrasted with other related fields, such as comparative corporate governance or comparative corporate law. This is to be expected in a field, CSR, that is still Moreover, the field of empirical CSR research generally has been hampered by the lack of a consistent definition of the construct of CSR, as well as its operationalization and measurement, as recently pointed out by McWilliams et al. (2006) and Rodriguez et al. (2006). This lack of consistency of CSR definitions across studies makes it difficult to evaluate and compare the findings from different studies because they usually refer to different dimensions of CSR. Most research on CSR has focused on the consequences of CSR implementation-or lack of implementation-on financial performance with little attention to comparative issues (e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Barnett and Salomon, 2006), the main exception being a meta-analysis which includes studies conducted in the context of different countries (Orlitzky et al., 2003). We know, however, from existing research that individuals are likely to have distinct expectations and attitudes towards CSR contingent on the industry (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Strike et al., 2006) or societal culture (Waldman et al., 2006) in which they are embedded

Corporate Social Responsibility in a Comparative Perspective

Comparative studies of corporate social responsibility (CSR) are relatively rare, certainly as contrasted with other related fields, such as comparative corporate governance or comparative corporate law. This is to be expected in a field, CSR, that is still Moreover, the field of empirical CSR research generally has been hampered by the lack of a consistent definition of the construct of CSR, as well as its operationalization and measurement, as recently pointed out by McWilliams et al. (2006) and Rodriguez et al. (2006). This lack of consistency of CSR definitions across studies makes it difficult to evaluate and compare the findings from different studies because they usually refer to different dimensions of CSR. Most research on CSR has focused on the consequences of CSR implementation-or lack of implementation-on financial performance with little attention to comparative issues (e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Barnett and Salomon, 2006), the main exception being a meta-analysis which includes studies conducted in the context of different countries (Orlitzky et al., 2003). We know, however, from existing research that individuals are likely to have distinct expectations and attitudes towards CSR contingent on the industry (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Strike et al., 2006) or societal culture (Waldman et al., 2006) in which they are embedded

A Configurational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance

We seek to bring to the core of the study of comparative corporate governance analysis the idea that within countries and industries, there exist multiple configurations of firm level characteristics and governance practices leading to effective corporate governance. In particular, we propose that configurations composed of different bundles of corporate governance practices are a useful tool to examine corporate governance models across and within countries (as well as potentially to analyze over time changes). While comparative research, identifying stylized national models of corporate governance, has been fruitful to help us think about the key institutional and shareholder rights determining governance differences and similarities across countries, we believe that given the financialization of the corporate economy, current globalization trends of investment, and rapid information technology advances, it is important to shift our conceptualization of governance models beyond the dichotomous world of common-law/outsider/shareholder-oriented system vs. civil law/insider/stakeholder oriented system. Our claim is based on the empirical observation that there exists a wide range of firms that either (1) fall in the "wrong" corporate governance category; (2) are a hybrid of these two categories; or (3) should be placed into an entirely new category such as firms in emerging markets or state-owned firms. In addition, as Aguilera and Jackson (2003) argue, firms, regardless of their legal family constraints, their labor and product markets, and the development of the financial markets from which they can draw, have significant degrees of freedom to chose whether to implement different levels of a given corporate governance practice. That is, firms might chose to fully endorse a practice or simply seek to comply with the minimum requirements without truly internalizing the governance practice. An illustrative example of the different degrees of internalization of governance practices is the existing variation in firms' definition of director independence or disclosure of compensation systems. We first discuss the conceptual idea of configurations or bundles of corporate governance practices underscoring the concept of equifinal paths to given firm outcomes as well as the complementarity and substitution in governance practices. We then move to the practice level of analysis to show how three governance characteristics (legal systems, ownership and boards of directors) cannot be conceptualized independently, as each of them is contingent on the strength and prevalence of other governance practices. In the last section, we illustrate how different configurations are likely to playout across industries and countries, taking as the departing practice, corporate ownership.

Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets

The turning to the XXI century has been marked by reforms in corporate governance practices around the world. Whether due to shocks caused by the economic crisis in East Asia, Russia and Latin America, or by financial scandals in the United States and Europe, the fact is that the way of doing business has changed in terms of demands for greater corporate transparency and accountability, shifts in control of ownership, empowerment of new types of owners and so on. Consequently, countries and firms have adapted their corporate governance policies and practices to this new governance environment. In this chapter, we discuss the foundation of corporate governance, that is, corporate ownership. In particular, we explore the current patterns of the ownership structure of publicly listed firms in six emerging countries. To do so, we have collected firm ownership data for listed firms in Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland during the first decade of the XXI century, and we compare our data with existing ownership research of these countries in the late 1990s. We conclude that although concentration of corporate shareholdings continues to be a common denominator among these emerging countries, the processes and structures controlling firms across countries is remarkably different. For instance, the privatization process in the 1990s, in spite of having different motivations and goals in Latin American and Eastern Europe shaped much of the corporate ownership transformations. Our chapter offers a comparative analysis of the corporate ownership changes in emerging markets.

Bridging accounting and corporate governance: new avenues of research

This paper draws on the articles in the Forum on Corporate Governance to discuss how corporate governance and accounting research complement each other well in explaining how companies are governed as well as properly managed from an accounting point of view. We put special attention to the cross-national differences in both corporate governance systems and accounting practice and how that affect multiple organizational outcomes ranging from financial performance to corporate social performance and reporting quality

Corporate Governance Deviance

We develop the concept of corporate governance deviance and seek to understand why, when, and how a firm adopts governance practices that do not conform to the dominant governance logic. Drawing on institutional theory, coupled with both the entrepreneurship and corporate governance literature, we advance a middle-range theory of the antecedents of corporate governance deviance that considers both the institutional context and firm-level agency. Specifically, we highlight the centrality of a firm\u27s entrepreneurial identity as it interacts with the national governance logic to jointly create corporate governance discretion (i.e., the latitude of accessible governance practices) within the firm. We argue that as a firm\u27s governance discretion increases, it will be more likely to adopt overconforming or underconforming governance practices that deviate from established norms and practices. Moreover, we propose that adopting a deviant corporate governance practice is contingent on the governance regulatory environment and a firm\u27s corporate governance capacity. We conclude by advancing a new typology of corporate governance deviance based on a firm\u27s over- or underconformity with the dominant national logic, as well as its entrepreneurial identity motives. This globally relevant study refines and extends comparative corporate governance research and enriches our current understanding of the institutional logics perspective

The cost of conformity to good governance : Board design and compensation

Altres ajuts: Acord transformatiu CRUE-CSICResearch question/issue: Albeit the fact that the "one-size-fits-all" corporate governance model has been mostly discarded, the debate on what constitutes a well-governed firm has converged toward a set of practices that comprise what we refer to as the global good governance norm. Whereas extant research has focused mainly on the benefits of good governance, we build on neo-institutional theory to explore how firm conformity or nonconformity to this global norm is associated with the cost of board governance, captured as board compensation. Research findings/insights: Using a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of firms listed in the Stockholm Stock Exchange, we find that the configurations of board practices conforming to the global good governance norm are associated with higher board compensation than those that score low on conformity. Based on our findings, we deduce four archetypical board design strategies jointly shaped by two central forces: the pressure toward conformity to the good governance norm and the extent of governance discretion, denoting firm agentic behavior. Theoretical/academic implications: First, our study highlights that conformity to the global good governance norm is accompanied with higher costs than nonconformity. Second, while most of the extant research discusses conformity and agentic behavior as two opposing forces, we uncover that they simultaneously co-exist in board governance, stressing their interconnectedness. Practitioner/policy implications: Conformity to the global good governance norm influences the strategic choices of board designs and the costs associated with such choices

Is managerial entrenchment always bad and corporate social responsibility always good? A cross‐national examination of their combined influence on shareholder value

Research summary: Building on the comparative capitalism's notion of institutional complementarities, we examine whether firms’ simultaneous adoption of managerial entrenchment provisions (MEPs) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reinforces or undercuts one another in influencing firm financial performance. We propose that the financial impact of such configurations is contingent on the country's institutional setting. In Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), where firms face strong pressures to achieve short-term goals, the combination of MEPs and CSR creates shareholder value, particularly when firms engage in internally oriented CSR projects. Conversely, in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), where institutions already curb short-term demands, the combined adoption of MEPs and CSR initiatives destroys shareholder value, particularly when this CSR is external. Overall, our study enhances understanding of the institutional complementarity between corporate governance and CSR. Managerial summary: This study examines how two organizational practices, managerial entrenchment provisions (MEPs), and corporate social responsibility (CSR), combine between them to improve or reduce firms’ financial success. Our analysis demonstrates that institutional framework has a strong influence on their combined effect. When the institutional context supports solutions to coordination problems among economic agents through market-based arrangements, MEPs allow the implementation of strategies directed to promote long-term investments and relationships. In this case, MEPs when paired with CSR allow generating intangibles that contribute to create shareholder value. Contrarily, in frameworks with coordination mechanisms based on nonmarket arrangements, the joint adoption of MEPs and CSR destroys value by increasing the power of managers and blockholders to extract rents at the expense of firms’ minority shareholders

Determinants of acquisition completion : a relational perspective

The strategic literature on relatedness in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is extensive, yet we know little about whether or how relatedness has an influence on the announcement to completion stage of the M&A process. Drawing on research on intra-industry competition and relational capabilities, we seek to shed light on the relatedness debate by examining the strategic forces that affect the completion of an announced related M&A, accounting for financial and organizational factors. We also explore additional strategic forces that might amplify or attenuate the negative effect of relatedness on deal completion. We test and find support for our hypotheses using longitudinal data from a sample of the largest M&A announcements in the world from 1991 to 2001